ยินดีต้อนรับ

พลเมืองที่รอบรู้เท่าทัน คือ พลังประชาธิปไตยที่แท้จริง
Well-informed citizens are the true democratic forces.

Wednesday, November 12, 2025

Challenging Pita Limjaroenrat's Vision of a Multipolar Asia


Pita Limjaroenrat's "State of Asia Address 2025," presented on November 5, 2025, at the Asia Society Switzerland, offers an optimistic framework for Asia's navigation of a post-hegemonic, multipolar global order through minilateralism, innovation, and structured peace mechanisms (Asia Society Switzerland, 2025). Drawing historical parallels to post-World War II Europe, Limjaroenrat positions 2025 as a pivotal moment where Asia must actively shape power dynamics amid the erosion of globalization and U.S.-China tensions. However, several core assumptions in his address—regarding hegemony, power dynamics, the role of the United States, the integration of Arab nations into this emerging "new era," and the countervailing effects of Donald Trump's policies—warrant critical examination. These notions appear overly idealistic, neglecting enduring asymmetries, fragmentation risks, and adaptations that sustain rather than dismantle traditional power structures. This analysis critiques these elements, drawing on contemporary scholarship and policy insights.Hegemony: Not Fading, but RepositioningLimjaroenrat posits a transition from U.S.-led unipolarity to a balanced multipolar system, wherein great-power rivalries afford Asian middle powers greater agency without a prevailing hegemon. This perspective underestimates the resilience and adaptability of U.S. hegemony in 2025. Rather than a genuine multipolar "mirage," the U.S. maintains primacy through military, economic, and institutional levers, fragmenting potential challengers ("The World After American Decline," 2025, October 20). For example, U.S.-established institutions, such as Indo-Pacific equivalents to NATO (e.g., AUKUS), enable strategic positioning that favors Washington over Beijing or other poles ("An American Strategy for a Multipolar World," 2025, September 15). Scholarly debates emphasize that multipolarity remains uneven, with the U.S. as the "strongest legacy power," benefiting from regional fragmentation more than its competitors ("The End of an Era: America's Waning Hegemony in a Multipolar World," 2025). Limjaroenrat's framework risks overlooking how U.S. decline proves "enduringly dangerous," inciting aggressive repositioning via measures like technology export controls, which disrupt rather than facilitate multipolar equilibrium ("The World After American Decline," 2025, October 21). Thus, hegemony is not dissolving but transforming into a "first among equals" paradigm, where the U.S. continues to set the terms of multipolarity ("American hegemony at a critical juncture, lessons from history's hegemonic transitions [EPUB]," 2025).Power Dynamics: Minilateralism as Fragmentation, Not ConnectionAt the heart of Limjaroenrat's "power" pillar lies minilateralism—adaptable, issue-focused coalitions among middle powers to foster a "network architecture of trust" and reconceptualize neutrality as economic diversification, bypassing outdated multilateralism such as ASEAN. Critiques, however, highlight minilateralism's potential to intensify power imbalances, functioning as "proto-alliances" that exacerbate rivalries in the absence of robust collective security ("New Multilateralism And Minilateralism Era: Shangrila-La Dialogue 2025 And What It Means To ASEAN In A New Strategic Political Gambit – Analysis," 2025; "The rise of competing minilateralism challenges multilateralism," 2023). In the Asian context, this shift undermines interdependence and globalization, directing growth toward exclusive groupings that precipitate over-deterrence and erode trust ("From Multilateralism to Minilateralism: How Maritime Cooperation Is Changing," 2025; "Multilateralisms and minilateralisms in the Indo-Pacific. Articulations and convergences in a context of saturation of cooperative arrangements," 2023). ASEAN's centrality is particularly compromised by proliferating minilaterals like the Quad, which diminish its security role and fragment regional cohesion ("How do minilaterals fit into the three-pillars of the ASEAN Community?" 2025; "Minilateral or Multilateral? A Role for ASEAN in an Evolving Indo-Pacific," 2024). Poorly managed, minilateralism undermines the legitimacy of essential multilateral bodies, cultivating a zero-sum landscape contrary to Limjaroenrat's stability vision ("Full article: Minilateralism: a new page for Indo-Pacific IR lexicon," 2025). This uneven empowerment favors dominant actors like the U.S. or China, who exploit minilaterals for division rather than equitable collaboration ("The rise and endurance of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific," 2024).Role of the United States: Pivotal Enforcer, Not Reluctant PoleLimjaroenrat depicts the U.S. as one actor in a bipolar rivalry with China, advocating Asian diversification to capitalize on tensions. This minimizes the U.S.'s role as an assertive enforcer of global norms, wielding unilateral influence over Asian trajectories. In 2025, the U.S. is not withdrawing but reasserting through economic instruments, as evidenced by persistent trade policies pressuring both allies and foes ("The Fragility of U.S. Spacepower in a Multipolar World," 2025). The Trump administration's invocation of emergency laws for tariffs on partners like Canada and Mexico extends to Asia, underscoring enduring hegemony via "strategic repositioning" ("The End of the Monroe Doctrine? U.S. Hegemony and the Inevitability of Multipolarity in the Americas," 2025). Retaining reciprocal tariffs on China compels the region into defensive stances, clashing with Limjaroenrat's proactive ethos ("US reaches limited trade deal with China and signs trade agreements with ASEAN partners," 2025). This adaptive centrality ensures the U.S. remains the essential mediator, constraining multipolarity rather than yielding to it ("An American Strategy for a Multipolar World [PDF]," 2025).Emerging Roles of Arab Nations: Sub-Imperial Alignments, Not True Multipolar PillarsAlthough Limjaroenrat's Asia-focused narrative implicitly incorporates Arab (predominantly Gulf) nations as middle-power contributors in energy and mediation within the multipolar "new era," their ascent often perpetuates hierarchies rather than democratizing power. In 2025, states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE navigate multipolarity through hedging, yet this translates to sub-imperial practices, such as resource extraction in Africa and self-serving infrastructure development ("The Gulf states Pivot to Africa: Enhancing geoeconomic engagement amid times of geopolitical shifts," 2025). They represent multipolarity's intricacies but serve as Washington's "new strategic anchor," engaging in high-value deals with reduced conditions that bind them to U.S. priorities ("The Gulf Navigates a Multipolar World," 2023). Forging a unified Arab agenda encounters obstacles like internal rifts and external reliances, rendering their contributions more responsive than revolutionary ("How Arab States manage multipolarity: A quick literature review," 2025; "The Arab World amidst Great Power Competition," 2025). As components of entities like the League of Arab States, they consolidate sway but frequently align with superpowers, intensifying imbalances over equilibrium ("Multipolarity reinforces Gulf's powerhouse status," 2025). This undermines Limjaroenrat's harmonious multipolarity, as Arab mediation in disputes reshapes diplomacy while potentially solidifying sub-regional dominances ("Gulf Arabs fear Israel is becoming Goliath," 2025).Trump's Efforts: Reinforcing US Dominance Against the "New Era"Limjaroenrat envisions 2026 onward as a "new era" of Asia-driven multipolarity, emphasizing transitions from manufacturing to innovation and peace via safeguards. Trump's policies, conversely, counteract this by employing tariffs and bilateral pacts to reaffirm U.S. preeminence, resisting power decentralization. During his November 2025 Asia visit, agreements with Southeast Asian countries (Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam) reduced U.S. export tariffs and tackled non-tariff barriers, economically tethering the region to America and subverting Limjaroenrat's diversification ("Shifts in U.S. Trade in Asia: Key Agreements from President Trump's October 2025 Asia Trip – Part I: Southeast Asia," 2025). The China accord, pausing tariff escalations for a year and relaxing critical mineral controls, represents not retreat but tactical respite: preserving 10% duties through 2026 while compelling market access ("Trump Administration strikes trade agreements with four Southeast Asian countries," 2025; "What happened when Trump met Xi?" 2025; "U.S. Agrees to Lower Chinese Import Tariffs," 2025). Imposing 40% penalties on rerouted Chinese goods pressures ASEAN into a U.S.-China bind, limiting minilateral autonomy ("Tariffs are on trial, but US trade talks are moving full steam ahead," 2025). These maneuvers challenge Limjaroenrat's paradigm by framing multipolarity as a hazard to neutralize, bolstering U.S. dependability while hindering Asia's sovereign ascent ("Why Did Asian Countries Give Trump So Much on Trade?" 2025).
Summary

In summary, while Limjaroenrat's blueprint is aspirational, it overlooks how entrenched entities like the U.S., bolstered by Trump's transactional approach, sustain disparities. Multipolarity persists but remains polarized and unstable, with minilateralism fostering division over unity, and actors like Arab states amplifying rather than mitigating great-power dominance.ReferencesAmerican hegemony at a critical juncture, lessons from history's hegemonic transitions [EPUB]. (2025, September 2). Frontiers in Political Science. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1511913/epubAn American Strategy for a Multipolar World. (2025, September 15). Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2025/an-american-strategy-for-a-multipolar-world/An American Strategy for a Multipolar World [PDF]. (2025, September 16). American Enterprise Institute. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Cooper-Stimson-An-American-Strategy-for-a-Multipolar-World.pdf?x85095Asia-Pacific Middle Powers: Holding the Line in Global Fragmentation. (2025, September 23). Development Research. https://www.developmentresearch.eu/?p=2362Asia Society Switzerland. (2025, November 5). State of Asia Address 2025 by Pita Limjaroenrat [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/Y7Gj1cHsGk4?si=Jm701TGp_7lGZ0h_Beyond the Alaska Summit: The Gulf States' Role in Ending the Ukraine War. (2025, September 24). Gulf International Forum. https://gulfif.org/beyond-the-alaska-summit-the-gulf-states-role-in-ending-the-ukraine-war/Competing Minilateral Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. (2025, September 18). Stephen Nagy. https://nagystephen.com/2025/09/18/growth-unlocked/From dollar hegemony to currency multipolarity? (2025, June 25). Institute of Geoeconomics. https://instituteofgeoeconomics.org/en/research/2025062121/From Multilateralism to Minilateralism: How Maritime Cooperation Is Changing. (2025, October 13). Comité Diplomatique ULB. https://www.comitediplomatiqueulb.be/posts/from-multilateralism-to-minilateralism-how-maritime-cooperation-is-changingFrom Multilateralism to Minilateralism: Regional Cooperation Trends in the Horn of Africa. (2024, October 16). Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/multilateralism-minilateralism-regional-cooperation-trends-horn-africaFull article: Minilateralism: a new page for Indo-Pacific IR lexicon. (2025). The Pacific Review. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2025.2556924Gulf Arabs fear Israel is becoming Goliath. (2025, August 12). Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/gulf-arabs-fear-israel-becoming-goliathHow Arab States manage multipolarity: A quick literature review. (2025, April 15). Jesse Marks Substack. https://jessemarks.substack.com/p/how-arab-states-manage-multipolarityHow do minilaterals fit into the three-pillars of the ASEAN Community? (2025, July 24). Human Development Forum Foundation. https://hdff.org/how-do-minilaterals-fit-into-the-three-pillars-of-the-asean-community-a-report-by-elena-wilt/How the Gulf can play a key role in global decision-making. (2025, February 20). World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/02/oil-futures-gulf-gcc-global-decision-making/India and Minilateral Cooperation: A Chosen Partner or a “Hard Nut to Crack”. (2025, March 19). Asia Society Australia. https://asiasociety.org/australia/india-and-minilateral-cooperation-chosen-partner-or-hard-nut-crackMinilateral or Multilateral? A Role for ASEAN in an Evolving Indo-Pacific. (2024, June 29). Bruin Political Review. https://www.bruinpoliticalreview.org/articles?post-slug=minilateral-or-multilateral-a-role-for-asean-in-an-evolving-indo-pacificMinilateralism: A Concept That Is Changing the World Order. (2023, April 14). Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/minilateralism-concept-changing-world-orderMultipolarity reinforces Gulf's powerhouse status. (2025, January 12). Arab News. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2586159Multilateralism, Minilateralism, and Indo-Pacific Diplomacy. (2022, April 26). Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/multilateralism-minilateralism-and-indo-pacific-diplomacyMultilateralisms and minilateralisms in the Indo-Pacific. Articulations and convergences in a context of saturation of cooperative arrangements. (2023, June 28). Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/recherches-et-documents/multilateralisms-and-minilateralisms-indo-pacific-articulations-and-convergences-context-saturation-cooperative-arrangements-2023New Multilateralism And Minilateralism Era: Shangrila-La Dialogue 2025 And What It Means To ASEAN In A New Strategic Political Gambit – Analysis. (2025, September 3). Eurasia Review. https://www.eurasiareview.com/03092025-new-multilateralism-and-minilateralism-era-shangrila-la-dialogue-2025-and-what-it-means-to-asean-in-a-new-strategic-political-gambit-analysis/Opportunities and Strategies for Indo-Pacific States in Navigating the Minilateral Shift. (2025, September 23). Stephen Nagy. https://nagystephen.com/2025/09/23/opportunities-and-strategies-for-indo-pacific-states-in-navigating-the-minilateral-shift-issure-brief-with-chintan-research-foundation/Reframing Cooperation in a Fragmented Indo-Pacific. (2025, October 23). Yokohama Conference on Asia Pacific Security. https://www.ycaps.org/blog/reframing-cooperation-in-a-fragmented-indo-pacificRethinking East Asian Peace, Over-deterrence, and Minilateralism. (2025, April 9). Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/rethinking-east-asian-peace-over-deterrence-and-minilateralism/Rethinking stability: investing in a multipolar world. (2025, October 24). Lombard Odier. https://www.lombardodier.com/insights/2025/october/rethinking-stability.htmlShifts in U.S. Trade in Asia: Key Agreements from President Trump's October 2025 Asia Trip – Part I: Southeast Asia. (2025, November 10). Global Trade Law Blog. https://www.globaltradelawblog.com/2025/11/10/shifts-in-u-s-trade-in-asia-key-agreements-from-president-trumps-october-2025-asia-trip-part-i-southeast-asia/Tariffs are on trial, but US trade talks are moving full steam ahead. (2025, November 12). Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/11/12/tariffs-are-on-trial-but-us-trade-talks-are-moving-full-steam-ahead-00645667The Arab World amidst Great Power Competition. (2025). Institute for National Security Studies. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/arab-states/The End of an Era: America's Waning Hegemony in a Multipolar World. (2025, May 2). The Science Survey. https://thesciencesurvey.com/editorial/2025/05/02/the-end-of-an-era-americas-waning-hegemony-in-a-multipolar-world/The End of the Monroe Doctrine? U.S. Hegemony and the Inevitability of Multipolarity in the Americas. (2025, October 11). Horn Review. https://hornreview.org/2025/10/11/the-end-of-the-monroe-doctrine-u-s-hegemony-and-the-inevitability-of-multipolarity-in-the-americas/The Evolving Role of Gulf States in Global and Regional Order. (2025, October 15). Gulf Research Center. https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/317The Fragility of U.S. Spacepower in a Multipolar World. (2025, July 15). War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/the-fragility-of-u-s-spacepower-in-a-multipolar-world/The Gulf Navigates a Multipolar World. (2023, February 24). Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gulf-navigates-multipolar-worldThe Gulf States in the Multipolar Transition. (2025). Project on Middle East Political Science. https://pomeps.org/the-gulf-states-in-the-multipolar-transitionThe Gulf states Pivot to Africa: Enhancing geoeconomic engagement amid times of geopolitical shifts. (2025, September 19). Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. https://www.bic-rhr.com/research/gulf-states-pivot-africa-enhancing-geoeconomic-engagement-amid-times-geopolitical-shifts-0The Remaking of the Indo-Pacific Security Architecture. (2025, June 3). Asia Pacific Leadership Network. https://www.apln.network/projects/asia-dialogue-on-china-us-relations/the-remaking-of-the-indo-pacific-security-architectureThe Rise of Minilateralism in China-ASEAN Defence Cooperation [PDF]. (2025, October 14). ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2025_77.pdfThe rise and endurance of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific. (2024, December 27). Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rise-endurance-minilaterals-indo-pacificThe rise of competing minilateralism challenges multilateralism. (2023, December 27). Italian Institute for International Political Studies. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-rise-of-competing-minilateralism-challenges-multilateralism-158673The World After American Decline. (2025, October 20). Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2025/10/hegemony-decline-trump-eu-china-bricsThe World After American Decline. (2025, October 21). Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt. https://www.cadtm.org/The-World-After-American-DeclineTrump 2.0 tariff tracker. (2025, November 10). Trade Compliance Resource Hub. https://www.tradecomplianceresourcehub.com/2025/11/10/trump-2-0-tariff-tracker/Trump Administration strikes trade agreements with four Southeast Asian countries. (2025, November 6). Hogan Lovells. https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/trump-administration-strikes-trade-agreements-with-four-southeast-asian-countries-Trump's Asia trip a surprising success. (2025, November 9). East Asia Forum. https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/11/09/trumps-asia-trip-a-surprising-success/U.S. Agrees to Lower Chinese Import Tariffs. (2025, November 12). The National Law Review. https://natlawreview.com/article/lower-tariffs-take-effect-under-new-china-trade-dealUS reaches limited trade deal with China and signs trade agreements with ASEAN partners. (2025, November 4). PwC. https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/tax/library/pwc-us-reaches-limited-trade-deal-with-china-signs-trade-agreements-with-asean-partners.htmlWhat happened when Trump met Xi? (2025, November 4). Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-happened-when-trump-met-xi/Why Did Asian Countries Give Trump So Much on Trade? (2025, November 12). Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/12/trump-trade-tariff-agreement-deal-asia-japan-south-korea-asean/